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Keenan: Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court

COMMENT

GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-There is a first amendment right of the
press and public to be present during the criminal trial in which the
victim is a minor; any statute authorizinga mandatory closure during a minor victim's testimony is unconstitutional;any statute authorizing the use of discretion by the trialjudge in deciding whether
or not to close the courtroom will be upheld where the standard
used is that of a "compelling state interest." 102 S. Ct. 2613
(1982).

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,' the United States
Supreme Court clarified its previous holding in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia2 that a first amendment right of access to criminal trials exists for the press and public. One year prior to the Richmond decision, the Supreme Court had seriously limited public
access with its holding that the sixth amendment 3 does not guarantee
access to criminal pretrial proceedings. The defendant, whom the
sixth amendment was designed to protect, was not guaranteed the
right to open pretrial proceedings as distinguished from the actual
trial. 5 The Richmond and Globe decisions apparently offer an alternative route of access to criminal trials for the press and public
1. 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
2. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
3. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,by an impartial jury ... ." U. S.
CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).
4. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (The press does not have a constitutional right to be admitted to a pretrial suppression hearing where the defense counsel has
moved to have a closed hearing since a large amount of adverse publicity had already been
published). The suppression hearing was in fact closed. Id. at 375. The Supreme Court recognized that the sixth amendment right to a public trial is a right available to the defendant
alone and that there was no provision in the Constitution that extends this right to the press
and public. Id. at 379-81.
5. Id. at 384-391.
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through the first amendment. The extent of such access rights must
now be determined. The Richmond Court recognized that first
amendment rights are not absolute8 and that, in order to ensure effective judicial rulings, concrete parameters must be set forth. 7 The
Globe Court, acknowledging the concerns enunciated in Richmond,8
held that a case-by-case determination should be made, with a closure order justified only when no alternative exists to preserve a
"compelling governmental interest, and [the closure order] is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 9
The holding in Globe, however, fails to supply the parameters
omitted in Richmond. The trial judge is given wide discretion to
weigh several factors, 10 yet the granting of discretionary powers will
yield results unanticipated and perhaps unjust in light of the sensitive considerations"' at issue. Primary among these considerations
are what rights, if any, the victims of crime, particularly minors,
have in our criminal justice system. Unlike other legal proceedings,
such as where the defendant is a minor, 12 there are no detailed provisions specifically geared to the minor victim of crime. While the
sixth amendment guarantees the defendant a fair trial, 3 and the
first amendment secures the rights of the public and press, 1 4 the victims of crime are forgotten parties in the Bill of Rights. They have
no protected right to demand that the courtroom be closed during
their testimony, and therefore must rely upon the trial judge who
may or may not deem their welfare an interest worthy of protection
from public voyeurism.
The trial judge must decide whether the state's interest in pro6. 448 U.S. at 581 n.18.
7. The guideline was set forth: "Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the
trial of a criminal case must be open to the public." Id. at 581. The Richmond Court's failure

to address the scope of an "overriding interest" was the basis for much criticism. See Note,
Public Trials and a First Amendment Right of Access: A Presumption of Openness, 60 NEB.
L. REV. 169, 196 (1981); Comment, The Richmond Newspapers Case: Creation of a First
Amendment Right of Access, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 1081, 1104 (1981).
8. 102 S. Ct. at 2620 (1982).

9. Id.
10.

"Among the factors to be weighed are the minor victim's age, psychological matur-

ity, and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests of
parents and relatives." Id. at 2621 (emphasis added).

11.

See Infra notes 120-40 and accompanying text.

12.
13.
14.

See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law

. ..

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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tecting the minor victim from confrontation with the press and public is a sufficiently compelling reason to curtail the press' and public's right of access to the courtroom. Moreover, when a courtroom is
ordered closed despite the first amendment contentions of the press15
and the public, 6 the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public
trial must still be considered.17
This comment argues that the case-by-case standard created by
the Court fails to consider sufficiently the position of the minor victim of a sex crime. It outlines the many considerations that should
be weighed in addition to those enumerated by the Globe Court. Alternatives available to aid the trial judge in making his determination are considered, and it is suggested that with the implementation
of some of the procedures that are outlined, the right of the defendant to a fair trial, the right of access of the press and public, and
the protection of the minor victim of a sex crime may all be effectuated. This will result in a more effective system of criminal justice
both for those who are personally involved and for those who have
legitimate concerns that the entire system of justice be executed
properly.
II.

THE GLOBE DECISION

A.

Background

The Globe decision arose out of an order issued by Associate
Justice Mulkern of the Superior Court for the County of Norfolk,
Massachusetts18 pursuant to a Massachusetts statute authorizing the
mandatory closing of the courtroom to the general public during the
testimony of a minor victim of a sex crime.1 9 The press and the pub15. Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2618 (1982).
16.

Id.

17. See State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1980). In this case, in which a
victim was to testify about a sexual assault, the trial judge deemed it proper to allow the
courtroom to be closed during the testimony. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in uphold-

ing the trial court's decision, acknowledged that "[t]he trial justice remains obliged, however,
to strike an acceptable balance between the accused's right to a public trial and the need to

protect the witness, paying particular attention that neither the scope nor the duration of the
order violates the rights of an accused." Id. at 63.

18. Commonwealth v. Aladjem, No. 73102-9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 1979) (hearing
on motions).
19.

MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (Vest 1981) provided:

At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other
crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person upon,

with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed, or at the trial of
a complaint or indictment for getting a woman with child out of wedlock, or for the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:1353

lic, including Globe Newspaper Company ("Globe"), were denied

20
access to a rape trial in which three minor victims were to testify.

Globe sought injunctive relief from the exclusion order, but the requested relief was denied.2 1
On appeal,22 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
ruled that the Massachusetts statute 23 required mandatory exclusion
of the press and the public from the courtroom only during the testimony of a minor victim. 2 ' Any exclusion during the rest of the trial
was within the trial judge's discretion and was not mandatory.25 The
court justified the exclusionary provisions of the statute as an attempt on the part of the Massachusetts legislature to afford protection to minor victims from the possible adverse effects2" that testimony before an open court might produce. Such protection was
provided to encourage those who might feel threatened by the judicial process to come forward and participate in the prosecution of
the case.27 The court noted that the victim's insecurity about the
need to relate the details of the crime in public would probably tip
the balance towards noncooperation with the legal authorities, a result not to be encouraged. Thus, a mandatory rather than discretionary construction of the statute was preferred.28 The court emphanonsupport of an illegitimate child, the presiding justice shall exclude the general
public from the courtroom, admitting only such persons as may have a direct interest in the case.
20. Commonwealth v. Aladjem, No. 73102-9, slip op. at 10a (Mass Super. Ct. Apr. 25,
1979). The court's ruling was in pertinent part:
This Court further rules that, consistent with General Laws Chapter 278 Section
16A, this trial will be conducted in such a manner that the general public shall be
excluded from the courtroom, including the press, and that only such persons as
may have a direct interest in the case will be permitted in the courtroom.
21. Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, No. 79-191 Civ. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Apr. 26,
1979).
22. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 401 N.E.2d 360 (1980).
While the appeal was pending the rape trial proceeded, closed to the press and public, and the
defendant was acquitted. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 261617 (1982). Globe's appeal was dismissed nine months after the trial was concluded. Despite
the fact that the case was moot, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled on the merits since such
issues would most likely arise again. Globe, 379 Mass. at 848,401 N.E.2d at 362.
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
24. 379 Mass. at 864, 401 N.E.2d at 371.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 859-61, 401 N.E.2d at 368-69. The court noted that the danger of psychological trauma when the victim testifies is as great as the danger of the sexual assault itself.
Humiliation, embarrassment, and the possible deterrent effect on the victim's coming forward
were highlighted as major criteria behind the enactment of § 16A.
27. Id. at 862, 401 N.E.2d at 370.
28. Id.
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sized that the press as a body was included in the exclusionary
provisions of the statute.29
Globe appealed to the Supreme Court which vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for further consideration3" in light of the Court's decision
in Richmond.31 On remand, the Massachusetts court recognized that
a strong state interest was embodied in the Massachusetts statute
and thus Globe's appeal was dismissed with the state statute remain33
ing intact. 32 Globe again sought review by the Supreme Court.
B. The Majority and Concurrence
The Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 4 found the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional on the
grounds that it violated the first amendment rights of Globe in particular, and the public's right in general.3 5 Justice Brennan announced the opinion of the Court. He considered whether "the state
interests advanced to support Massachusetts' mandatory rule barring
press and public access to criminal sex-offense trials during the testimony of minor victims" are "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and [whether the statute] is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest."38
29.

The court opined:

Admittedly, the presence of a few more persons in the courtroom might not appreciably increase the victim's anxiety about her testimony. But the knowledge that those
few extra persons were reporters who might publish her testimony to thousands

would probably increase by orders of magnitude her sense of exposure, vulnerability,
and alarm. We believe that a policy of admitting the press during young victims'

testimony would substantially increase the risk that the Commonwealth would lose
the benefit of that testimony.
Id. at 864, 401 N.E.2d at 371. While it was not suggested that publication of the testimony be
barred, it was a goal of the statute that the courtroom be designed in such a way (i.e.,

cleared), so as "to preserve [the minor victims'] ability to testify by protecting them from
undue psychological harm at trial." Id. at 860, 401 N.E.2d at 369.
30. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 449 U.S. 894 (1980).
31. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
32.
33.

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 423 N.E.2d 773 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1981).
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2620. The Court opined that "the State's justification in denying access must
be a weighty one," id., and that for the statute to be upheld it must be constructed in such a

way that it will specifically accommodate that interest. See id. A case-by-case approach rather
than mandatory closure ensures "that the constitutional right of the press and public to gain

access to criminal trials will not be restricted except when necessary to protect the State's
interest." Id. at 2621-22.
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One of the interests furthered by the Massachusetts statute 7
was acknowledged as compelling but not sufficient to warrant
mandatory closure during the testimony of a minor.3 8 The effectiveness of mandatory closure in furthering the state's other interest was
criticized as a speculative measure without any substantive justification. 39 The history of open trials in the United States and England,
and the first amendment safeguard of the public's right to attend
criminal trials and thus ensure public scrutiny, participation, and
discussion,40 were the primary factors considered by the Court. The
Court reiterated its position that a strong state interest may close the
doors to the public, but a mandatory closure provision could not be
sustained. 41 A case-by-case determination as to whether or not closure would be justified was held to be a viable alternative procedure.42 The Court opined that "[a]mong the factors to be weighed
are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity, and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the inter' These factors would be considered
ests of parents and relatives." 43
by
the trial court on a case-by-case basis to ensure "that the constitutional right of the press and public to gain access to criminal trials
will not be restricted except where necessary to protect the State's
'44
interest.
The historical basis upon which open criminal trials have been
built was a major concern for the Court in Richmond45 and was furthered by the Globe decision where a mandatory exclusion statute
directly aimed at testimony during a criminal trial was also at issue. 4 Justice O'Connor's concurrence, consistent with this historical
precedent, therefore was made with a stipulation that the Court's
ruling should not have ramifications outside the area of criminal
7
trials. 4
37. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
38. 102 S. Ct. at 2621.
39. Id. at 2622. The Court wrote about the State's interest of encouraging minor victims' testimony: "The Commonwealth has offered no empirical support for the claim that the
rule of automatic closure contained in § 16A will lead to an increase in the number of minor
sex crime victims coming forward and cooperating with state authorities."
40. Id. at 2619-20.
41. Id. at 2621.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2621-22.
45. 448 U.S. at 564-73.
46. 102 S.Ct. at 2619.
47. Id. at 2623 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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C.

Dissenting Opinion

A strong dissent by Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justice
Rehnquist joined,48 is of particular interest due to the fact that Chief
Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion in Richmond,49 the case
relied upon by the Globe majority. Chief Justice Burger wrote that
the Massachusetts statute's mandatory closure provision was evidence of the type of compelling state interest which the Court in
Richmond held would justify closing a criminal proceeding. 0 Since a
transcript of the minor victim's testimony would be available for
public scrutiny, Chief Justice Burger characterized the intrusion on
the public's right as a minimal one and not an invasion warranting a
finding that the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional.51
Describing the Court's action as a "cavalier rejection of the serious
interests supporting Massachusetts' mandatory closure rule," 52 Chief
Justice Burger set forth a forceful argument recognizing the state's
deep concern for a victim's welfare and the danger of its usurpation
by the majority's holding. 53 The Chief Justice recognized that behind the statute lay a purposeful protection from humiliation and
adverse psychological effects for the minor victim, as well as an encouragement to minors to come forward without worrying whether
or not the judge would allow the trial to remain open during the
minor's testimony. 54 He noted that the statute "is intended not to
preserve confidentiality, but to prevent the risk of severe psychological damage caused by having to relate the details of the crime in
front of a crowd which inevitably will include voyeuristic strangers." 55 With regard to a mandatory order, to have it otherwise
could act to deter the actual reporting of the crime because "[t]he
victim might very well experience considerable distress prior to the
court appearance, wondering, in the absence of such statutory pro48. Id. at 2623. There was an additional dissent filed by Justice Stevens. Id. at 2627.
49. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
50. 102 S. Ct. at 2624-25 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "While denying it the power to
protect children, the Court admits that the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the victimized child is a compelling interest. This meets the test of Richmond Newspapers." Id. at 2625
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The majority's holding was also criticized on state
sovereignty grounds. Chief Justice Burger wrote that "the Court's decision is nevertheless a
gross invasion of state authority and a state's duty to protect its citizens-in this case minor
victims of crime." Id. at 2623-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 2625 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
54. See id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2626 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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' Chief Justice
tection, whether public testimony will be required."56
Burger recognized the historical access to criminal trials, but noted
that the right to an open trial was not absolute and challenged the
morality behind any ruling denying to a minor victim the same treat57
ment given to a juvenile responsible for a criminal act.

III.

TREATMENT OF THE JUVENILE DEFENDANT

Chief Justice Burger's characterization of the majority opinion
in Globe58 as one of "callous indifference" 59 toward the welfare of
the child victim is more striking when consideration is given to the
historical treatment of the juvenile delinquent in the justice system.
Unlike the adult offender who is arrested, indicted by a grand jury,
given a trial, sentenced and subsequently punished, the child offender is taken into custody, a petition is filed, a hearing is given
which results in a disposition and, "the net result [is] 'redirection'
and 'rehabilitation' not punishment." 60 The difference in the language used by the courts symbolizes the difference in treatment that
minors who break the law have received ever since the first juvenile
court was established in 1899.61 Society has recognized that the
treatment of the juvenile offender merits careful supervision and has
taken steps to provide such supervision through the use of special
judges and the active intervention of probation officers and counselors. 62 While the setting for the juvenile proceeding is different from
that of an adult trial, and the age of the offender has precipitated
different legal procedures and treatment,6" the juvenile defendant is
at the same time allowed to assert many of the same constitutional
rights that the adult defendant may raise. 4 The Supreme Court has
56. Id. at 2627 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. Id. Chief Justice Burger wrote: "Many will find it difficult to reconcile the concern
so often expressed for the rights of the accused with the callous indifference exhibited today
for children who, having suffered the trauma of rape or other sexual abuse, are denied the
modest protection the Massachusetts legislature provided." Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
58.

102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).

59. Id.at 2627.
60. P. LEwIs & K.

PEOPLES, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS-CASES

702 (1978).
61. Id. The first Juvenile Court Statute was passed in Illinois and provided for a separate court to handle cases in which the defendant was a minor. Id.
62. Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the CriminalJustice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 977 (1969).
63. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982) (to qualify for
AND COMMENTS

treatment as a juvenile delinquent and be taken out of the criminal court, the person must be
over seven and less than sixteen years old).

64. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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ruled that children are entitled to the same procedural protections in
juvenile delinquency hearings 65 as the adult is entitled to assert
within the context of a criminal proceeding. 6 In addition to allowance for these constitutional safeguards, the treatment of the juvenile centers around one factor-age. This factor has motivated state
legislatures to enact a separate procedure for the juvenile offender
with sensitivity akin to that of a parent who feels for her own child. 7
The minor child accused of committing a crime has a particular
advantage worthy of notation-protection from having his or her
identity released to the press or public.' The Supreme Court has
held that the defendant in a juvenile proceeding should be shielded
from the public, and that the state's interest in protecting the minor's privacy is so significant, that even the minor defendant's own
claim with respect to the right to a jury trial will not be sustained."
In light of the above described special treatment that the minor
defendant has received for nearly a century, the disregard for the
sensibilities of the minor victim of a sex crime takes on added significance. The need for a more detailed and unwaivering procedure
geared toward the minor victim should be set forth with a constant
reminder that the juvenile victim, although a party innocent of any
crime, is still a child deserving of the same paternal treatment extended toward the juvenile delinquent, a party accused of a crime.
65. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (right to constitutional safeguard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 55, 56-57 (1967) (right to

timely and adequate notice of scheduled court proceedings, right to counsel, privilege against
self-incrimination and right to cross-examination of the witness).

66. The juvenile delinquent, however, is denied one procedural protection that the adult
defendant has the right to assert-the right to a jury trial. See McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971) (no right to a jury trial).
67. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 200-286 (West Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT.

ANN. §§ 39.001-.516 (West Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.37,§§ 701-1 to 707-6 (SmithHurd 1972 & Supp. 1982); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 711-784 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1982).

See also P. LEwIs & K. PEOPLES, supra note 60, at 702. "The purpose of the [juvenile] court
was to provide the juvenile with guidance and protection and to assist in redirecting his behav-

ior.
Id.

.

.Thus, the state, via the juvenile court, was to act as 'parent' or 'guardian' to the child."

68.

See B.A. MORosco, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMEs § 4.03(1), at

4-245 (1978).
69.

McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1971) ("If the jury trial were to

be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that
system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possi-

bly, the public trial. . . .[T]hese very factors were stressed.

.

.[i]n the abolition of the jury

trial in the juvenile court." Id. at 550).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

IV.

[Vol. 11:1353

THE CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH: Is THIS THE ANSWER?

Globe 0 marks the first time the Supreme Court has ruled on
the specific question of the press and the public's exclusion from
criminal trials since the Richmond decision. The Court was faced
with the task of reconciling its previous recognition of the first
amendment right of access to criminal trials with the needs of minor
victims of sex crimes.7 1 The groundwork in deciding such issues had
been broadly summarized in Richmond 2 and a narrowing interpretation was needed. Instead of supplying the necessary interpretation,
however, Globe dictates that the trial judge exercise case-by-case
discretion in deciding whether a compelling state interest is present
that will justify closing the courtroom. 73 Allowing the trial judge
such discretion, however, necessarily leaves the victim unable to predict the judge's decision.
The many consequences of the Globe decision merit further attention. Primarily, some guidelines must be set forth to aid the trial
judge in making his decision. To facilitate construction of such
guidelines, a series of factors to which the judge should give serious
consideration are outlined below.
A. Factors to be Considered by the Trial Judge
1. Historical Preferencefor Open Trial.-When any proceeding is closed to the public, an immediate and understandable suspicion arises as to the nature of that proceeding and to the necessity
for denying public surveillance. 4 Society in general has found
grounds for distrusting any gathering held behind closed doors as an
evil subject to scrutiny. 75 History has shown that what the people do
not know may indeed hurt them76 and thus, stringent efforts have
70. See Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
71. In Globe, the Court's task of reconciling its previous recognition of the first amendment right of access to criminal trials with the needs of minor victims of sex crimes arose from
a closed courtroom order where the three complaining witnesses were all minors, two sixteen
and one seventeen, and the crime was rape. Commonwealth v. Aladjem, No. 73102-9 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 1979).
72.

448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).

73. 102 S. Ct. at 2621.
74. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
75.

See Id. at 268; See also Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation:Rape Cases in

the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 89 (1977) ("In large part based on historical aversion
to secret bodies like the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, known for religious and political
oppression, the mandate for an open proceeding is thought to ensure against broader forms of
abusive behavior.").
76. See Berger, supra note 75, at 89.
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been made to keep criminal proceedings open to prevent any miscarriage of justice.7 Justifications frequently raised7 8 in favor of maintaining open criminal trials are that open trials act as checks on
prosecutorial conduct"9 and possible perjury, 80 and that the publicity
might serve to alert possible witnesses who might aid in the proceeding.81 An open criminal proceeding in particular offers a feeling of
security to the public that justice is being served.8 2
In addition to these public interests, the defendant has a constitutional right to a public trial.8 This right serves to ensure the defendant a fair trial. Courts have held, however, that
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is not absolute, but
rather must be balanced against other interests-such as protecting
a witness from intimidation or embarrassment, maintaining the
fairness and orderliness of the proceedings, or protecting trade
secrets or the confidentiality of law enforcement techniques-which
might justify exclusion.8
While the courts have recognized rights of the defendant, the
press, and the public to an open criminal trial, historical analysis
reveals that such rights are not absolute. There is also a recognized
historical preference for closing courts during the trial of sex
crimes, 8 5 particularly when the complainant-witness is a minor, 86
77. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
78. See id at 268-71 (check on prosecutorial misconduct); Tanksley v. United States,
145 F.2d 58, 59, 60 (9th Cir. 1944) (alerting of potential witnesses and prevention of perjury).
79. Berger, supra note 75, at 89.
80. Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Sex Crime Trials, 22 B.C.L. REV.
361, 365 (1981). The possibility of perjury has been considered less likely when the trial is
open because when the testifier recognizes that what he says will be heard by the public, he
will also recognize the increased chance that what he says may be checked for accuracy. See

id.
81. It has been argued that if the proceeding is open, the potential to alert others who
might have an interest in the outcome, or who might be able to contribute their own
knowledge and experience, will be increased. Note, All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public's
Right To View Judicial Proceedings and Records, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 311, 315 (1979).
82. See Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2620 (1982).
83.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

84. Butler v. Smith, 416 F. Supp. 1151, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also United States
ex rel Smallwood v. LaValle, 377 F. Supp. 1148, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
85. Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1966) (courtroom closed during
twenty-three year old rape victim's testimony); State v. Callahan, 100 Minn. 63, 69, 110 N.W.
342, 344 (1907) (courtroom cleared when adult rape victim became unable to testify in presence of crowd); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 237 Pa. Super. 457, 467-68, 352 A.2d 509, 514
(1975) (closure of adult rape victim's testimony to prevent embarrassment). Cf. Bivins v.
State, 313 So. 2d 471, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (exclusion of public during victim's
testimony).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:1353

which the Globe Court failed to consider. Courts have reasoned that
the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial must yield
with the circumstances of the particular case. 87 In sex crime cases
where the victim is a minor, it has been seen as "reasonably necessary in order to protect a witness from embarrassment," 88 to exclude
the public from the courtroom during the minor victim's testimony.
Where the acts at issue are revolting, 9 an effort has been made to
preserve the minor victim's dignity and to protect the minor from
further humiliation in front of prurient spectators by excluding all
who do not have a direct interest in the case.90
A study of many state practices reveals a series of laws which
seek to preclude judicial reliance on historically open criminal trials.91 Through the use of closure statutes, 92 release of deposition testimony, 93 and videotaped testimony,9 4 states have responded to legiti86. See United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821, 823 (D. Alaska), affid, 262 F.2d 151
(9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959) (courtroom closed during testimony of nine
year old victim); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 438-40, 86 S.W.2d 931, 932-33 (1935) (courtroom closed during testimony of ten year old rape victim); State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 207,
251 A.2d 178, 182 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969) (courtroom closed during testimony of minors during rape trial); Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 507-08, 180 S.W.2d
423, 424 (1944) (judge may close trial during minor victim's testimony where defendant is
charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor).
87. See United States v. Geise, 158 F.Supp. 821, 824 (D.Alaska), affd, 262 F.2d 151
(9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 249, 599
P.2d 199, 205 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
88. United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Alaska 1958) aff'd, 262 F.2d 151
(9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959). See also Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437,
439, 86 S.W.2d 931, 932 (1935) (courtroom closed during testimony of ten year old rape
victim due to embarrassment when relating details).
89. State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 207, 251 A.2d 178, 182 (1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 928 (1969).
90. State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 249-50, 599 P.2d 199, 205-06 (1979) (citation
omitted).
91. For a general survey of state practices see VI J. WiGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
§ 1835 (Chadbourne Rev. 1976): "Exceptions to the Rule of Publicity: (1) Excluding persons
from the courtroom. . . . By statute in most states [exceptions in favor of closed proceedings]
are expressly sanctioned, either in general terms, or for special classes of cases, such as divorce, rape, and the like, or for special classes of persons, such as minors." Id. at 445 (emphasis in original).
92. See, e.g., Miss. CONsT. art 3, § 26 (1972 and Supp. 1982); ALA. CODE § 12-21-9
(1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.16 (West Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-166 (Supp.
1981).
93. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-660 (Law. Co-op. 1977); VA. CODE § 18.2-67 (1982).
94. See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2312 (1978) (videotaping of minor witness'
testimony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918-16 (West Supp. 1983) (videotaping of child victim 11
years old or younger); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1981) (videotaping of any sexually
abused victim); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1983) (videotaping of sexually abused
minor victims' testimony).
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mate concerns about open proceedings with a recognition that
special circumstances may limit traditional access to criminal
proceedings.
In Harrisv. Stephens,95 the nature of the crime and the welfare
of the victim witness were considered a substantial basis upon which
to authorize closure during the testimony of the victim. In Harris,
the twenty-three year old female victim had been shot, raped, and
left naked on a country road.96 The trial judge permitted the courtroom closed to spectators during her testimony. 97 Upon conviction,
the defendants sought a writ of habeas corpus.98 The Eighth Circuit,
affirming the conviction, held that the argument concerning the closing of the courtroom to spectators during the testimony of the victim
was spurious, since "[t]his is a frequent and accepted practice when
the lurid details of such a crime must be related by a young lady." 99
More recently, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in State v.
Santos 00 upheld the trial court's exclusion order during the testimony of the twenty-two year old female victim of a sexual assault.
Notwithstanding the defendant's assertion that his sixth amendment
right to a public trial had been infringed, 101 the court declined to
overturn what it considered to be an act of sound discretion on the
part of the trial judge, opining that "[iun light of the lurid nature of
the crimes about which the complainant testified, it was reasonable
for the trial justice to conclude that [the victim] would be able to
relate her testimony to the jurors only in the absence of court
spectators. ' 0 2
Both Harris and Santos exemplify the courts' concern for the
adult victim while the victim is testifying; concerns for the minor
victim are even more compelling. In United States v. Geise,103 the
rape victim, a nine year old girl, was allowed to testify in a courtroom closed to the public.1°0 The defendant's motion to set aside the
95.

361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966).

96. Id. at 890.
97. Id. at 891.
98. Id. at 889.
99. Id. at 891.
100. 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1980).
101. Id. at 62.

102. Id. at 64. The case involved the testimony of a rape victim. The court felt that due
to the nature of the acts, there was a strong likelihood of emotional and psychological trauma

to the victim. Id..
103.
104.

158 F. Supp. 821 (D. Alaska 1958).
Id. at 823.
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judgment due to the exclusion of the public was denied.10 5 The court
recognized that "the excluding of spectators in a prosecution for
statutory rape in which the prosecuting witness is of tender age has
been held proper, in the discretion of the court, in order to prevent a
miscarriage of justice."106 Protection of the child from embarrassment was seen as a measure necessary if testimony was to be effectively procured.10 '
Arguments in favor of open trials based upon historical precedent should consider the nature of the crime involved in deciding
whether or not to allow closure. The argument set forth in Richmond 08 stressed the historical openness of criminal trials in general 108 and concluded that "[firom this unbroken, uncontradicted
history,. . . a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of
a criminal trial . . ,"I" While the social utility of open criminal

trials is not disputed, 1 the notion that there is an "unbroken" history of openness cannot be justified." 2 In Richmond, the crime involved was murder, and a Virginia statute granted the trial judge
discretion to order closure if he felt it was necessary to ensure fairness to the defendant.1 13 The closure order did not specify any particular part of the trial, but rather, enabled the trial judge to close
the entire proceeding.11 4 It was the closure of the entire trial which
formed the basis for reversal and for the recognition of first amendment rights of access.11 5 The Court was not confronted with a nar105. Id.
106. Id. at 824.
107. Id.
108. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-73 (1980).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 573.
111. Id. at 569-71. Open courts provide a means whereby the public can check the administration of criminal justice with the end result being a feeling of security for the public.
Id. See supra text accompanying notes 74-82.
112. See VI J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 1835 (Chadbourne Rev. 1976).
113. VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (Supp. 1980) provides in pertinent part:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases,
the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose presence
would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a
public trial shall not be violated.
114. Compare 448 U.S. at 560 with Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 375
(1979) (closure for the pretrial suppression hearings only).
115. 448 U.S. at 563-64. The Supreme Court noted that unlike Gannett, where the issue
was access to pretrial hearings, the issue presented here was whether a denial of access to the
trial itself could be sustained. The Court did not suggest that a trial must always be open. The
factors to be considered were whether a defendant would be denied his right to a fair trial and
whether or not the state had a legitimate concern which necessitated closure. Id. at 564.
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rowly construed closure statute that delineated a particular part of
the trial. To withstand a strict review of a closure order for the entire trial, the Court mandated that all alternatives be weighed and
considered.11 6 The reasoning of the Richmond Court therefore suggests that if it had been confronted with a narrower closure order,
the statute itself would have withstood constitutional scrutiny.
The statute found unconstitutional in Globe had a much more
limited scope, with closure permitted during only one part of the
trial: "during the testimony of a minor victim in a sex-offensetrial." 1"' Such a specification of the type of crime and the age of the
victim was a calculated attempt by the Massachusetts legislature to
restrict the number of instances in which closure would be
allowed." 8
2. Factors to be Considered where the Victim is a Minor and
the Trial is Open.-The historic treatment of the victim evidences
steps taken by both the state legislatures and the courts to offer protection to victims by allowing the exclusion of the public from sexual
assault trials.11 9 Closure has been upheld where the victim was an
adult;1 20 where the victim is a minor,121 the factors to be considered
by the judge in making the final determination are even more
compelling.
Societal concern for the adult victim of a sex crime is largely
centered around the victim's own regard for emotional self preservation, since the adult victim has legitimate anxiety when required to
testify. 22 The concern for the child victim, on the other hand, is not
only centered around whatever anticipation the child might have as
to what will be required in court, but additionally encompasses a
116.

Id. at 580-81, (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64

(1975)) (Alternatives to be considered include change of venue, postponement of trial, questioning of prospective jurors, jury instructions, juror sequestration and gag orders). Witness
sequestration and exclusion from the courtroom are further alternatives. Richmond, 448 U.S.
at 563, 581.
117. 102 S. Ct. at 2618.
118. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 862-64, 401 N.E.2d
360, 370-71 (1980).
119. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
120. Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 237
Pa. Super. 457, 352 A.2d 509 (1975).
121. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
122. J. BARKAS, VICTIMS 100 (1978). The reaction of the victim to the sexual assault
produces a variety of feelings ranging from shame to an actual denial that the crime occurred.

As a result, the victim may attempt to alleviate further emotional damage by choosing not to
report the crime at all. Id.
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societal concern that the child's testimony be accurate. 21 3 The emotional effects of the attack on the child coupled with open courtroom
testimony may lead to results contrary to the purpose of the minor's
testimony. "[A] child is likely either to be confused and frightened
by the presence of many persons, or impressed with his unusual opportunity for enthralling a large audience with his stories. In both
cases the public's presence may serve to interfere with the child's
powers of recollection and narration.1 124 Besides the danger of inac-

curate testimony, the child may experience some of the same emo1 25
tional traumas an adult faces, with understandably worse effects.
Psychiatrists have observed that "the victim naturally wishes to
avoid publicity, the embarrassment which accompanies questioning
by authorities, or courtroom experiences. Children in particular are
often profoundly disturbed by this situation. 1 26
The emotional and mental results of a sexual assault on the minor, although traumatic at the moment of occurrence,1 2 7 can often

123. The trauma of testifying in court may be especially crucial for the child who has no
forewarning as to what will be required in court. The questioning by both the prosecution and
the defense attorneys is not geared to the needs of an immature witness who must relive the
harrowing experience; thus, there is a need for specialized training of those who will question
the child so as to alleviate much of the anxiety that will occur, and in turn enable the child to
testify accurately. Cf. E. HILBERMAN, THE RAPE VicTIM 53 (1976).
124. Libai, supra note 62, at 1021.
125. See J. BODE, RAPE 75-76 (1979).
126. Halleck, Emotional Effects of Victimization, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW
684 (1965) quoted in Libai, supra note 62, at 1021.
See also T. GIIBENS & J. PRINCE, CHILD VICnMS OF SEX OFFENCES 9-14 (1963). Gibbens
and Prince conducted a study in England involving two groups of case records: (1) a random
sample of 82 cases drawn from the admission register of sex areas of the Federation of Committees for the Moral Welfare of Children; and (2) a sample of 46 cases believed to have been
involved in a prosecution. Id. at 9. The results noted that "comparison shows that in the court
cases there were fewer without overt disturbance." Id. at 14.

Recovered Quickly

Random Sample

Selected Court Cases

56

18

The study noted that it was "not possible to attribute the difference only or mainly to court
involvement. Much depends upon the previous maladjustment." Id. It was generalized, however, that cases which ultimately came to court were of a much more serious nature. Id.
A commentary on this and other studies summarized that because of the relative scarcity
of accurate estimates, no precise conclusion could be drawn. It was surmised, however, that
"[m]any of the child victims should be given preventive treatment such as medical care, psychotherapy, and social welfare services." Libai, supra note 62, at 983.
127. For a general discussion of rape-induced trauma, see HILBERMAN, supra note 123,
at 54 (study of adult women who were raped as children and later suffered behavioral
problems. A cited analytic study revealed that the childhood rape had resulted in a self-destructive aggression toward themselves and the outside world).
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be lessened with time and counseling. 12 8 Unfortunately, when the
child is brought to testify, the nightmare occurs all over again. One
study reported that children who appeared in court were more likely

not to recover from their underlying traumatic experience and to suffer behavior problems as a result, than children who did not have to
make any court appearance.12 9 The effect of the assault itself is magnified by the necessity of having the child repeatedly describe the

incident in front of strangers as well as the defendant.

30

The crime,

coupled with subsequent testimony, may produce such emotional
damage to the child that clinical therapy and counseling may be re-

quired to alleviate the adverse consequences."3 ' The necessity for repeat testimony is a factor that must be addressed, since the child
must testify at least three times: at a hearing to show cause, before
the grand jury, and at the trial itself.132 These frequent court ap128. See generally Schultz, The Child as a Sex Victim Socio-Legal Perspectives, in IV
VICTIMOLOGY: A NEw Focus 177, 178-81 (1973).
129. T. GIBBENS & J. PRINCE, supra note 126, at 13-14.
130. Schultz, supra note 128, at 180.
131. See Koch, Sexual Abuse in Children, 15 ADOLESCENCE 643, 645 (Fall 1980).
Koch reported the results of a survey conducted in 1969 by V. DeFrancis, Director of the
American Humane Association. In a sampling of 263 child victims, the results were as follows:
two-thirds of the sample were emotionally disturbed, and of that figure:
a) 14% were severely disturbed and needed clinical therapy;
b) 19% were moderately disturbed and needed counseling or some service from a
child guidance center;
c) 33% were mildly disturbed and needed case work or counseling. Id. at 645.
The emotional side-effects for the child victim can be best explained when one sees the
involvement of the child in the actual criminal proceeding. DeFrancis, using a sample of 173
cases in which court proceedings were initiated noted the following:
The 173 cases. . . involved 58 Grand Jury hearings, 155 court hearings and 23
full trials. Each of these involved questioning of the child victim by the district
attorney, the judge and opposing counsel. The victim was subjected to cross-examination in 33 cases (13%). Grand Jury appearances (58 cases). . .did not subject the
child to examination by defense counsel but the child may have been exposed to
questioning by members of the Jury. Before each of these hearings and trials, the
child witness was questioned by the prosecuting attorney. . . .This could be, and in
some cases was, a trying and grueling exposure for the child.
V. DEFRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMITTED BY ADULTS: FINAL REPORT. 187-88 (1969).
The effect of the criminal proceedings on the child victim was of concern to the victim's
parents. Among their complaints was criticism of the Grand Jury process which necessitated
that the child appear alone without parental support. Id. at 194. Outrage was expressed over
the fact that the courtroom hearings were open to the public. DeFrancis noted that "[the child
and the family] felt exposed-their problems and their shame or guilt were openly discussed in
front of 'everybody.'" Id. at 193. Parents were also quite angry "with defense counsel whose
cross-examination tried to make the child appear to be a liar and a cheat." Id. at 194.
132. Burgess & Holmstrom, The Child and Family During the Court Process, in SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 205 (1978).
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pearances can cause great emotional stress for the child as well as
for the parents.""3
The studies that concern the effect of the sexual assault on the
child have included followup research on adults who were victims of
sexual assault as children. A marked similarity was noted: they all
experienced extremely low self esteem because "the trauma had
caused irreparable damage."13 4 When what may be labeled a natural
reaction to the assault itself is compounded by the anxiety producing
effect of courtroom testimony, the overall picture may be a lifetime
of depression. 13 5
There is a connection between the actual effect the testimony
has on the minor victim and whether the courtroom is open or
closed. The actual presence of the press and public may impact on
133. Koch, supra note 131, at 647. A solution to this problem is the use of videotape.
Decreasing the number of times testimony is required allows the child to forget the incident
sooner. See infra text accompanying notes 166-76.
134. E. HILBERMAN, supra note 123, at 54. (citing Katan, Children Who were Raped, in
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 208-24 (1973)). This study was one of only a few
reported studies. The sample size was six adults interviewed about adverse effects.
135. See id. (if the child victim and his or her family decide to aid the prosecution, then
"it islikely that prolonged counseling support will be necessary.")The possibility of severe
adverse effects on the child victim presents an additional consideration: if we want the victim
to testify, and if the victim is adversely affected as a result, then who should pay for treatment
of subsequent psychological problems? The victim may sue the defendant for any physical
injury and/or psychological distress he or she sustained as a result of the attack. Cf. Garland
v. Herrin, No. 79 Civ. 1384, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1983) (parents of slain victim successfully sued the man responsible for their daughter's death in an action for civil damages for
emotional distress suffered after the death); Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 66 A.D.2d 604, 414
N.Y.S.2d 350 (2d Dep't 1979) (allowing suit by kidnapped victim to recover moneys paid to
Crime Victims Compensation Board upon kidnapper's sale of the crime story); N.Y. ExEc.
LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982) ("Distribution of moneys received as a result of the commission of crime").Few victims, however, follow the civil action route to collect compensation
since damages awarded by the court or jury are generally too much for the defendant to pay.
J. BARKAS, supra note 122, at 180. A recent alternative available in a majority of states to aid
the victim of crime is the enactment of crime victim compensation statutes. E.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 258A §§ 1-8 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620-635 (McKinney
1982); VA. CODE § 19.2-368.1 to .18 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.69.010 to
.030 (1983). Whether such legislative enactments will benefit the child victim who suffers
subsequent psychological trauma, however, will depend on the particular state's statute. In
New York, there is a provision that affords the victim counseling services for the trauma suffered as a result of the crime. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 623(21) (McKinney 1982). The amount of
money to be spent to compensate the victim will depend on the fund available. In Virginia, any
person convicted of specified crimes after July 1, 1976, must pay a flat rate of $15 into the
fund. Va. Code § 19.2-368.18(B) (Supp. 1980). In New York, the fund is provided for by the
state and also any additional grants or gifts that may be received. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620,
623(19) (McKinney 1982). The intent of the New York legislature in its efforts to aid the
victim was to "encourag[e] a restoration of faith by citizens in the criminal justice system."
Id. at § 623 (Legislative Findings and Intent).
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the witness' ability to relate details accurately.13 A prosecuting attorney has described the situation involving such testimony as follows: "[The victim] must go into a courtroom, face cross-examination and the trauma associated with an act of violence, an especially
degrading one. .

.

.[Breaking and entering] isn't the same as rape

when you have to describe what happened. 37 The difficulties the
child victim experiences are compounded when the courtroom is
filled with strangers and when the defense counsel subjects the child
to extensive cross-examination. Together, the effect can be shattering.138 The defense attorneys will "attempt to show that the child is
malicious, incompetent, 'seductive', or lying for a variety of reasons-the same techniques used so often with older, more mature
victims."139 As a result, a leading psychiatric expert has advocated
the practice of closed hearings for the taking of a child victim's testi140
mony so as to prevent the child from being subjected to strangers.
V.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

The possible adverse effects that may occur as a result of open
courtroom testimony may be lessened and even eliminated if certain
procedures, geared toward alleviating any additional trauma to the
child victim, are implemented by the state legislatures and courts.
A.

Limiting the Number of Spectators

The decorum of the courtroom is one aspect of the trial that
could and should be controlled to assist the minor victim who must
testify during an open trial. Due to the adverse effects noted
above, 141 quantitative limitations might be imposed upon members of
the press and the public permitted to enter the courtroom. 1 42 A ra136.

See supra text accompanying note 124.
MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM 73

137. J.
(1982).
138.
(1976).

N.

GOGER

& C.

SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA

54

139. Id. at 54-55.
140. Dr. Edward H. Weiss, a psychiatrist, professor at Georgetown University and
chairman of a D.C. medical subcommittee on rape, id. at 45, "advocate[s] private questioning
in the judge's chambers; an adult surrogate for the child during court examination; or if the
child must appear in court, the use of child specialists, social workers, or doctors to conduct

the questioning." Id. at 55. See infra text accompanying notes 166-89.
141.

Supra text accompanying notes 124-26.

142.

The use of such limitations on access to the court has been a procedure commonly

used in sex crime trials. See State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 249-50, 599 P.2d 199, 205-06

(Sup. Ct. 1979) (courtroom closed to nonpress spectators during victim's testimony); cf. Doug-
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tionale used by courts and state legislatures as a justification for any
limitation on public access has been that "fewer spectators in the
courtroom lessen the victim's trauma and allow him or her to testify
more fully and accurately, thus promoting the fair administration of
justice."1 ,43 If entrance is to be limited, however, a determination
must be made as to who will be denied access. The possible infringement of constitutional guarantees must also be considered. 44 The

defendant himself may wish to limit attendance and thus limit
prejudice to his case. 145 The defendant does, however, have an inter-

est in having certain people present during his trial 146 and the Supreme Court has recognized the defendant's right to their presence,1 47 These few necessary spectators usually will be endurable to

the child victim. 1 48 Voyeuristic spectators, the press, and the media

1 49
in general, however, often present hardships for the witness. It fol-

lows, therefore, that if a discretionary standard is implemented, the
victim and his or her parents will wonder whether the press and public will have an unlimited right of access if the trial is open. It has
been recognized by the American Humane Society that the parents

are deeply concerned with the entire criminal justice process and its
las v. State, 328 So.2d 18, 20-21 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1976) (exclusion of nonpress members of the
public during victim's testimony); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 63 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1980)
(courtroom exclusion of spectators during testimony of victim of sexual assault).
143. Note, supra note 80, at 361.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
145. The possible circus atmosphere has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as a
sufficient ground for reversal of a defendant's conviction. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965). In Estes the defendant's conviction on swindling charges was reversed due to the inordinate amount of pretrial and trial press coverage. The deprivation of a fair trial was the major
ground for reversal. The filmed pretrial hearings were seen by approximately 100,000 viewers
prior to the commencement of the trial, and the courtroom itself "was a mass of wires, television cameras, microphones and photographers." Id. at 550. The effect of adverse publicity, the
impression such coverage had on the jurors, the difficulties the judge faced in controlling the
courtroom, Id. at 551, and the potential for defendant's inability to testify competently, see id.
at 549, were all factors considered by the Court in its order reversing the defendant's
conviction.
146. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-72 (1948) (those who may be present include his
friends, relatives and counsel).
147. Id. See also Berger, supra note 75, at 92.
148. Cf. Berger, supra note 75, at 92 (addressing the effects on all victims).
149. See United States v. Kobli, 72 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1949) (recognition that in a
rape prosecution, a minor victim could be "seriously embarrassed in giving her testimony by
the presence of spectators not concerned with the trial."); Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 659,
108 SE. 47, 52-53 (1921), appealdismissed, 260 U.S. 702 (1922) (Exclusion of spectators in
rape trial where victim, a female minor, was to give testimony. The court viewed the victim's
highly nervous condition as adequate grounds for a presumption that testimony before an open
courtroom would be impeded.).
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effects on their child. 1 0 The trial judge, therefore, should be able to
place limits on who will be allowed in the courtroom. As has been
done in the past, the voyeuristic public should be excluded with preferred accommodation given to the press."51 The Supreme Court,
however, has stated that the press may not assert a preferred right of
access over that of the general public, 5 2 but the Court has also characterized the press as a surrogate for the public when a situation
warrants limitations on the right of access.'5 3 When the nature of
the case and the amount of publicity a case has received prior to
trial are significant, the likelihood that there will be unmanageable
numbers of spectators may provide a basis for placing the press in a
preferred position.'" The interest at stake, however, must not be disregarded when the seats in the courtroom are filled by members of
the press.
If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the State must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information. Their political
institutions must weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of
the public to know and of the press to publish.155
Without instituting alternatives such as censorship, "reliance must
rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish or
broadcast."" '
Not only is there legitimate distress as to what the press may
publish, but there is also concern whether the press, when allowed in
the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of a sex crime,
will acknowledge the permission as a signal that all forms of the
media can have equal access to the courtroom.1 57 In Chandler v.
88 camera coverage of a criminal trial was held not to be an
Florida,"
150. See Koch, supra note 131, at 647-48.
151. See supra note 142.
152.

Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).

153. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975) (press can act as
surrogate for the public when there is limited time and resources).
154. See Note, supra note 80, at 379-80.

155.

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).

156. Id.
157. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2625 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing concern for the victim who may be subjected to camera
coverage).

158. 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (defendants on trial for conspiring to commit a burglary challenged a provision of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct that permitted court media cover-

age, claiming that it should be held unconstitutional both on its face and as applied). The
Court held that the Constitution did not prevent the states from experimenting with such cov-
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unconstitutional violation of a defendant's right to a fair trial. 159
Limitations, however, have been recognized. In deciding the extent
to which camera coverage would be allowed, the Court noted that
"Florida admonishes its courts to take special pains to protect certain witnesses-for example, children, victims of sex crimes, some
informants, and even the very timid witness or party-from the glare
of publicity and the tensions of being 'on camera.' "160 The Chandler
opinion, therefore, extends a caveat to the trial court judge that the
considerations of whether or not cameras will be allowed in the
courtroom should include an appraisal of not only whether the defendant might be denied a fair trial, but also of whether that particular
case will include a minor victim's testimony of the details of a sex
crime.
It is hard to conceive of a permission order for camera coverage
in such a case when one considers the historical practice of a closed
court extended to the minor victim while he or she testifies;" 1 it
must be remembered, however, that there has been no mandate
against such coverage by the Supreme Court and the matter must
therefore be decided by the states. 62 Other states do have provisions
allowing some type of electronic media coverage, 63 and, as Chief
Justice Burger cautioned in his Globe dissent, an order requiring an
open courtroom may be disastrous because in most states, the effect
of camera coverage could expand the range of viewers to a home
viewing audience who may observe a tape of the court proceeding on
the evening news. 64 Although publication is not barred, the provisions aim at reducing the psychological difficulties inherent in the
actual testifying. In keeping with the general consensus among authorities who deal with victims of crime, Chief Justice Burger noted
that the "ordeal could be difficult for an adult; to a child, the experience can be devastating and leave permanent scars." '65
erage, and that despite the fact that the defendants made an objection to camera coverage,
there was no violation of their constitutional right to a fair trial. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 85-107.
162. Starcher, Cameras in the Courts-A Revival in West Virginia and the Nation, 84
W. VA. L. REV. 267, 276 (1982).
163. See id. at 270; e.g., CAL. CIv. & CraM. CT. R. §§ 980-980.5 (West 1981 & Supps.
1982 & 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 467B (1982). But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
164. 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2626 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also E. HILEERMAN, supra note 123, at 53; Berger, supra note 75, at 88.
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B.

The Use of Videotaped Depositions

Another suggested alternative available is the videotaping of the
child's testimony. Four states have express provisions1 66 allowing
such taping, and its use in the courts has gained much acceptance
and recognition. The Arizona procedure is typical: The child victim
testifies in the judge's chambers. In the room with the child are the
defendant, defense counsel, the prosecution, and the judge. The
videotape can then be used at trial for presentation to the jury when
the court deems it proper.167 In Florida, the statute specifically states
that the judge "shall preside at such proceeding and shall rule on all
questions as if at trial." 168 This ensures fairness to all involved.
The use of videotaped depositions has been upheld in other situations.16 9 In the case of the child victim, although the minor could
testify "live," there are reasons why the courts should offer the alternative it offers other witnesses. The use of videotape may lessen the
victim's anxiety because the number of persons present at the taping
would be limited.170 In addition, the benefit afforded by videotaping
the child's testimony prior to trial allows the child to forget the
ordeal as soon as possible. The procedure involved necessitates that
the defendant and the defendant's attorney be present 7 so as to
guarantee the defendant's constitutional rights to confront his accuser and to effective counsel.11 2 The press and the public are also
not deprived of their rights of access to the trial since they will be
allowed to view the tape and thus witness the victim's demeanor during testimony. The argument that the presence of the press and the
public lessen the likelihood that the child-victim will perjure herself' 73 should not prevent the use of videotape because the minor will
testify in the presence of the judge and other necessary parties-the
166. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-2312 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.17 (West Supp.
1983); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp.
1983).
167. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2312 (1978).
168. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.17 (West Supp. 1983).
169. For example, when it is impossible for a witness to appear in court, videotape is an
effective alternative. Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 385 F. Supp. 711, 716 (E.D. Pa.
1974)(mem).
170. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2312 (1978).
171. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979)(case remanded because witness was unaware of defendant's presence during the videotaping. Court noted there
might be exceptions to the rule requiring face to face confrontation such as waiver by defendant or misconduct).
172. Id. at 821-22.
173. See supra note 80.
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defendant, his family and friends, counsel, jury, and court officials. 17 4
The procedures, therefore, will not be drastically different from the
open court procedure. The use of videotape may thus offer a viable
alternative to an open courtroom proceeding. This alternative also
represents an advancement from the traditional practice of reading
written depositions in lieu of actual witness testimony. Courts have
recognized that the "showing [of] videotaped testimony of an unavailable witness at a trial is superior to reading a deposition transcript,"' 1 5 and since the taping will be done in the presence of the
judge, 1 8 the danger of inaccuracy or tampering may be eliminated.
C.

The Use of a Special Courtroomfor the Minor-Victim's
Testimony

A third solution available is the implementation of a child's
courtroom,1 77 which seems the least offensive to all involved. The key
advantage of implementing such a facility is the ability to have the
testimony of the minor victim and the viewing of the testimony occur
simultaneously. 17 8 The key disadvantage, however, is that the implementation of the use of special courtrooms may be financially burdensome to the state.
The purpose of the child's courtroom is to make the legal proceeding as relaxed as possible for the minor victim. 11 The child is
not exposed to the regular courtroom, but rather is permitted to give
his or her testimony within the confines of a special room specifically
designed for such testimony.-In this room, the child testifies in front
of a few selected persons.180 Those who are not permitted in the
child's courtroom may view the entire testimony of the minor victim
through a one way glass.1 8 ' The room would be used only while the
child testifies, with the rest of the trial continuing within the regular
174.

See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.

175. E.g., In re American Broadcasting Cos., 537 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 n.10 (D.D.C.
1982).
176. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2312 (1978). As far as what will be done
with the videotape after the testimony is taken, it has been settled that the public and press

may view the tapes, as may the jury; however, release of the tapes is not required by either the
first amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press, or the sixth amendment's guarantee of a
public trial. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-10 (1978).
177. Libai, supra note 124, at 1016.
178. Id. at 1017.
179. Id.
180. The article suggests that the people permitted to be present should be limited to

"the judge, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and [a specially trained] child examiner." Id.
181.

Id.
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courtroom. 182
The benefits of the use of a special facility for the child can be
optimized by providing a trained child examiner who will conduct
the taking of the child's testimony.18 3 The use of the child courtroom
examiner, who is especially tuned to the needs of the child, would
alleviate the trauma a child often suffers through interrogation by
attorneys who are not trained to deal with children and who "tend to
use adversary approaches appropriate for adults which are successful
in gaining convictions."18 14 If an effort is made to have a specially
trained interrogator for the child, perhaps the chance that the victim
will be traumatized through testifying will be lessened.
Another advantage of using a special courtroom is the ability to
have the child testify without having to see the defendant. The effect
of encountering the defendant for a second time has been isolated by
psychiatrists as a major source of disturbance for adult victims of a
sexual assault 8 5 and for child victims as well.18 Through the use of
microphones and earphones that will enable the defendant to communicate with his attorney, who is in the child's courtroom, the defendant may remain outside the child's view while still maintaining
his constitutional right to be present at his own trial.18 7 If identification of the defendant is necessary, the defendant may enter, with a
group of people, for the brief period needed for identification. The
child courtroom will provide a means whereby the defendant can
check his attorney's acts, hear the victim's testimony, and keep open
a line of communication with his attorney to aid in guaranteeing an
effective cross-examination. 188
Implementation of the child's courtroom will incur costs of construction by either an addition to the court or the building of a new
structure.18 9 Costs could be limited, however, by adapting the judge's
chamber to provide the same advantages that a new structure would
provide. The benefits of such a structure far outweigh any inconve182. Id.
183. Id. at 1011.
184. Schultz, supra note 128, at 180.
185. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape: The Victim and the Criminal Justice System, in III
VICT1MOLOGY-A NEw Focus 13 (1975).
186. Libai, supra note 124, at 984.
187. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witness against him ... and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CorsT. amend. VI.
188. Libai, supra note 124, at 1020.
189. Id. at 1017.
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nience to the state or to its taxpayers. The accused may face the
accuser; the public and the press may view the proceedings as they
occur; and the reduction in personal anxiety for the victim is
significant.
VI.

RAMIFICATIONS OF A DISCRETIONARY STANDARD

The Globe Court concluded that court closure is not justified in
all cases involving a minor victim of a sexual assault. 190 Even if closure is mandatory only during the minor victim's testimony, such a
statute would not withstand constitutional muster.19 The Globe decision has placed the well-being of the victim below the constitutionally recognized rights of the press, the public, and the defendant.
Before any court closure will be upheld, the trial judge will have to
weigh all the factors in any particular case. 192 The reality of the situation, however, is that there are no set guidelines for the judge to
consider; there is also the concommitant possibility that there will be
no real uniformity in future decisions upon which a victim may
rely.193 'Judicial discretion' "means merely that the decision is uncontrolled by fixed principles or rules of law. '1 94 Leaving the decision to the trial judge has been justified because it is he who sees the
case at hand and can best make an educated determination.1 95 A
major criticism of allowing such discretion is the fear that it "may
be antithetical to consistency of treatment, a major ingredient of justice." 196 This criticism should be considered where the minor victim
of a sex crime is concerned, mainly due to the danger of placing
sensitive issues such as the emotional make-up of a child in the
hands of one not trained to decide such matters.19 7 The judge must
be made aware that the ordeal the victim goes through is two-fold:
the actual incident itself and the reliving of it when testifying about
190.
191.
192.
193.

Globe, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2621 (1982).
Id. at 2622.
Id.
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 818 (3d Cir. 1981) (reviewing trial judge's

discretion whether to allow press to copy video and audio tapes previously admitted into
evidence).
194. Id. at 817.
195. Id. at 817-18.
196. Id. at 818.
197. Unlike in juvenile proceedings, see supra text accompanying notes 60-69, the criminal trial judge is not specially appointed to hear a particular type of proceeding, nor does he
have specially trained counselors who are involved in the proceeding and who will offer their
opinions concerning the particular case.
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the details on the stand."9 8
Perhaps, to aid the judge, a court appointed psychiatrist could
evaluate the victim and in turn advise the judge. Such a procedure is
already a common practice in determining a defendant's competency
to stand trial199 and ought to be extended to the victim. While it is
not being suggested that the victim has a constitutional right to
treatment equal to that of the defendant, as a matter of public policy, it is strongly urged that the minor victim be given fair consideration throughout the trial ordeal. The recognition of the special needs
of the child victim should be a factor in providing for such psychological services when one considers the established procedures that
are employed in the juvenile justice system.200
It must be re-emphasized that the discretionary standard, without additional guidance by the legislature and/or specially trained
counselors, may have a great impact on the successful prosecution of
sex crimes in which the victim is a minor. The victim's testimony is
essential to the prosecution, and without a set standard upon which
the victim (or the victim's parents) may rely, much valuable assistance may be lost to the prosecution and to the state.
There is a strong possibility that there will be an increase in
unreported crimes due to the victim's fear of testifying in open
court.201 Sex crime victims as a class are not encouraged to report
the crime. This results from the absence of specific provisions to aid
them during the prosecution. Statistics show that sex related crimes
are, to a large extent, unreported.20 2 Two studies set the figures for
sexually abused children at 60,000203 and 100,000 20°per year, and
these figures have been criticized as too low.205 The fact remains that
a prevalent crime is not being curtailed because it is estimated that
198.

See Dunlop, Victims of Crime, Miami Herald, Sept. 17, 1978 at G6, col. 2; see

supra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
199.

18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1979) ("[T]he court shall cause the accused . . . to be ex-

amined as to his mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the
court."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).

200. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
201. See Schultz, supra note 128, at 180-81. The strong possibility may be inferred
from the recognition that unless more trauma reducing techniques are implemented by the
courts, the option of not reporting the crime at all may be the option preferred to safeguard
the child's well-being.
202. J. BARKAS, supra note 122, at 130 (1978).
203. Id. (statistics of the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect in Washington,
D.C. on sexually abused children).
204. See id. (statistics of the American Humane Association in Denver on child rape
victims).
205.

Id.
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only 10% of sexual assaults on minors are ever reported.2"'
VII.

CONCLUSION

Society owes the minor victim of a sex crime at least the same
considerations that have historically been made available to a juvenile responsible for a crime. Without the child's testimony, the prosecution's case would be virtually nonexistent.20 7 It follows, therefore,
that the legal authorities should actively seek to facilitate the child's
testimony in order to secure a conviction, and thereby protect society
from the individual responsible for the crime. This goal of effective
prosecution should be encouraged and the victim's testimony procured. It must be remembered, however, that "this assistance [from
the child] may well be severely traumatic,"20 and the adverse effects
that may result from the child's participation ought to be a primary
concern of the trial court.
Crime prevention is surely a high state interest, but without the
help of the victims, prevention is close to impossible. The requirement asserted by the Globe Court-that there must be an empirical
certainty that a mandatory closure order during the testimony of a
minor victim of a sex crime will increase the number of crimes reported 2 0 9- is contrary to society's goals.
Guidelines must be established to aid the trial judge, encourage
the victims, and provide a fair trial to the defendant. To place the
rights of the press and the public above consideration for the victim
is a harsh reality when no safeguards are provided. The intrusion on
the press' and the public's first amendment right of access to criminal proceedings, and on the defendant's sixth amendment right to a
public trial, will not be severe if mandatory videotaping or the use of
a child's courtroom is initiated during all sex crimes trials where the
victim is a minor. The minor victim's testimony and demeanor while
testifying will still be available to the press and public while, at the
same time, the child victim will be offered assistance and protection
during a time of great difficulty.
Globe suggests a case-by-case determination but fails to define
adequately the criteria a judge should follow in deciding a motion to
close the court. If mandatory videotaping or child courtrooms become recognized procedures in all states, the result would be a more
206. See id. (based on study of a Boston children's hospital).
207. See Note, supra note 80, at 364.
208. Libai, supra note 124, at 986.
209. 102 S. Ct. at 2622.
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equitable treatment for all parties and a more efficient system of
prosecution of sex crimes in which the victim is a minor.
Sally M. Keenan
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